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Civil Discourse and Religion in
Transitional Democracies: The Cases of
Lithuania, Peru, and Indonesia
David Ingram

On January 19, 2004, world-renowned German political theorist Jürgen
Habermas met with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI)
to discuss religion as one of the cultural foundations of the democratic
state.1 Two points of convergence emerged from their discussion. First,
both agreed that reason alone cannot sustain respect for individual dignity
and the common good without more substantive faith commitments. Second, they agreed that these values, however complementary they might be
philosophically, are difﬁcult to harmonize in practice. Agreeing on policies
that respect the right of each to pursue his or her own conception of the
good appears all but impossible in light of incommensurable belief commitments and especially so whenever these commitments are viewed as
divine commands whose truth cannot be doubted and whose prescriptive
meaning cannot be compromised.
This chapter focuses on the duty of citizens living in democracies to
wrestle with this dilemma in a civil manner. Recent events surrounding the
Arab Spring conﬁrm that religion can be a powerful weapon in furthering
the transition to democracy, now recognized as crucial to the realization of
peaceful coexistence and respect for human rights. Democracy sustains a
310
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stable and enduring respect for the rule of law because citizens recognize
its legitimacy as a fair procedure. This chapter argues that the capacity of
religion to promote democratic reform in a way that respects this procedure must extend beyond its recognition of the liberal principle of human
rights and toleration. It must also extend to recognizing the republican
principle of non-domination.
Non-domination goes beyond guaranteeing individual freedom from
government encroachment and the freedom to elect government ofﬁcers.
Such liberal freedoms still permit majorities to impose unilaterally their
interpretation of rights and public welfare on minorities. To avoid this tyranny, republicanism recommends constitutional checks and balances that
divide power, including provisions guaranteeing effective political representation of minorities and other vulnerable groups, such as women. Beyond
these institutional arrangements, republicanism urges the cultivation of
free and inclusive political deliberation aimed at the common good, but in a
manner that respects, rather than suppresses, basic religious differences.
The question here is whether such deliberation requires citizens to
refrain from imposing policies that restrict basic constitutional liberties
whenever the rationales underlying these policies are based exclusively on
premises whose authority cannot in principle be universally accepted. The
argument here is that it cannot, for the simple reason that what counts as
publicly reasonable in any given polity will reﬂect shifting value commitments that ultimately rest on particular authoritative traditions and comprehensive beliefs.
Deliberative civility will often (but not always) require framing political
arguments in terms of this substantive public reason. Rules of civility will
depend on the degree of ideological pluralism as well as on the establishment (or lack thereof ) of democracy out of transitional process. Following
discussions of Lithuania, Peru, and Indonesia, this chapter holds that the
very dynamics of democratic deliberation offer strategic incentives to religious parties for becoming increasingly more respectful of difference and
less sectarian by arguing for social justice positions that have broad appeal
across groups. Such moderation of religious discourse can lead, in turn, to
forging a more inclusive and balanced public reason for morally principled
(not merely strategic) reasons. That said, republican embrace of political
pluralism, even when morally principled, need not incorporate respect for
individual rights unless institutional guarantees (above all, independent
judges) protect this liberal value against communitarian domination.
First, a clariﬁcation is needed of what is meant here by civil deliberation grounded in public reason. A citizen’s feeling morally obligated to

This content downloaded from
67.165.190.50 on Tue, 25 Oct 2022 19:14:34 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
18696-Shuck_Democracy.indd 311

8/31/15 12:20 PM

312

David Ingram

voluntarily abide by a law she opposed is dependent on her belief that
those backing the law tried to convince her of its rightness by appeal to
evidence she could recognize as authoritative, even if she did not judge the
evidence to be compelling. However, expecting religiously motivated citizens to provide generally acceptable reasoning cannot be construed in
such a way as to restrict their freedom of religious expression. Believers
should not have to subordinate their faith to secular reason. To demand
that persons who are guided by divine revelation abstain from political life
because they cannot yet formulate reasons based on more commonly
accepted authorities, the natural sciences, for example, imposes a burden
on them that their more secularly minded consociates do not carry. For
this reason, some proviso to the effect that such reasons be given in due
course (as Rawls recommends) or that nonbelievers equalize the burden
by taking it upon themselves to reformulate religious arguments in more
secular language (as Habermas recommends), seems eminently reasonable.2 Indeed, everyone (nonbelievers included) should try to translate
their dogmatic, comprehensive core commitments into language that others ﬁnd acceptable.
The antagonism of liberals toward Catholicism in Europe and Latin
America was linked to fear of religion intruding into politics.3 Well into the
twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church opposed liberalism and
democracy. These ideas and their accompanying social movements threatened the authority of the pope as guide to all things moral and spiritual.4
Yet it was precisely the Catholic Church’s decision to participate in democratic politics that eventually restrained its hegemonic demands and
enabled it to support political frameworks of public reasoning congenial to
its values.
As discussed by Marcia Hermansen and Peter Schraeder in this volume,
Samuel Huntington observes that the “third wave” of democratization
from 1974 to 1990 was “overwhelmingly a Catholic wave,” with roughly
three-quarters of the thirty countries transitioning to democracy being
predominantly Catholic.5 Among the beneﬁciaries of this wave were Peru
and Lithuania. In Peru, the Catholic Church took an active role in organizing the urban and rural poor in accordance with liberation theological
precepts while condemning guerrilla- and government-sponsored violence. Meanwhile, in Lithuania, with a Catholic majority of 81 percent,
the Church opposed the communist regime by strongly advocating on
behalf of liberal constitutional principles and human rights.
What made the Church’s role as a promoter of liberal democratic reform
possible in these countries? In both Peru and Lithuania, Catholicism was
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part of the national identity while it simultaneously stood apart from the
state proper. The separation of the Church from the state in these countries
enabled the Church to become more accepting of liberal democracy and
vice versa. Hence, it is not surprising that the Church’s authority in pushing
authoritarian regimes toward democracy was strongest in situations where
it refused state accommodation (e.g., Poland) and weakest where it accepted
it (e.g., Spain).6
The Lithuanian Catholic Church’s leading role in resisting communist
“Russiﬁcation” reﬂects a third outcome midway between that of Spain and
Poland. The reasons for the diminished prestige of the Church today are
complex, ranging from the peculiar nature of the Lithuanian reform movement prior to post-Soviet independence, to what many scholars perceive to
be the incursion of secular attitudes among a population that remains
highly distrustful of any institutional authority. The chapter by Nerija
Putinaitė in this volume goes far in explaining this phenomenon. Lithuanian perestroika was headed by the 1988 Lithuanian Reform Movement
Sa˛judis and supported by the Lithuanian Communist Party. Hence, it was
divided between factions that sought only national autonomy from the
USSR and factions that sought full liberal democracy within a multiparty
system.7 The Catholic Church saw itself (and was seen by most Lithuanians) as primarily a defender of national religious and linguistic identity,
rather than an advocate of liberal democratic reform. Economic liberalization has since trumped the social agenda proposed by the Church, with
most of the signiﬁcant political parties and organizations within civil society representing labor and business interests.8
Lithuania’s fragmented political environment seems to call for a recommitment to the republican ideal of democratic solidarity, but it is uncertain whether the Catholic Church can lead in this area. Some critics
defend a secular morality based on Kantian notions of individual freedom
and responsibility, seeing that as more in keeping with modern notions of
liberalism.9 Others argue that the moral skepticism generated by ﬁfty
years of Communist dictatorship “in the name of the common good”
instilled in Lithuanians a shallow version of liberal toleration. This shallow toleration eliminated commitment to fraternity, the civic virtue that
prevents liberal democracy from degenerating into a winner-take-all contest.10 With this in mind, it would seem that greater Church involvement
in Lithuanian political life will require an expansion of its agenda to address
social justice issues and refocus its commitment to defending republican
solidarity. This move would require bridging Church doctrine and secular
economic theory.
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If the Peruvian Catholic Church has had more success in reaching out
to the broader public, it is because its strong commitment to the poor has
found greater appeal among a population that is less willing to embrace
neoliberal economic policies. Again, the Church’s defense of human rights
against predations by both revolutionary movements and government
forces, as well as its promotion of reconciliation based on a full disclosure
of the truth concerning war atrocities, has enabled it to appear as the chief
defender of republican civility, public reason, and the common good.
Although the Church has had a long history of defending the rights of
indigenous people, at least conceptually, dating back to the colonial era, its
advocacy on behalf of the poor and disadvantaged in Latin America achieved
unprecedented political impact with the emergence of the Liberation Theology Movement in the late 1960s. In 1976, the Episcopal Commission for
Social Action established its own department of human rights and became
a major force for raising popular consciousness regarding human rights
abuses during the second phase of the military government. Given its singular responsibility for organizing poor rural and urban communities (not
to mention its vital role in being the primary conduit for almost all donations, voluntary services, and international aid targeting the disadvantaged),
the Church today is regarded as the one public institution that Peruvians
trust most in administering resources for human development.
Thanks to its unrivaled prestige among all sectors of civil society, the
Church has maintained its high proﬁle by branching out to other sectors.
As described in Soledad Escalante’s contribution to this volume, having
lost its status as the ofﬁcial state religion in 1980, the Catholic Church
remains ofﬁcially recognized (see Article 86 of the 1979 Peruvian Constitution) as “an important element in the historical, cultural, and moral
formation of Peru” with which the state offers its cooperation, in conjunction with collaborating with other confessions. Despite its privileged status, the Church had also endured a tense relationship with the state
antedating the Constitution and the subsequent concordat with the Holy
See (1980).11 At times, this has placed the Church in the uncomfortable
and unpopular position of having to defend its particular vision of public
morality against both state and public opinion. The Peruvian Catholic
Church opposed liberalization of abortion and divorce by the Fujimori
government, yet it had earlier supported the distribution of birth control
pills for purposes of family planning and poverty reduction.12 The Church
later aligned with public opinion and the growing woman’s movement
(itself a major force in the advancement of human rights) in opposition to
forced government sterilization of poor women. Today, the gender stud-
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ies program of the Catholic University of Peru is regarded as one of the
strongest in the Andean region.
In recent years, Church involvement in the political life of the country
has been subdued due to internal political divisions between conservatives
and progressives. During the “dirty war” of the 1990s, the Church hierarchy was split in its criticism of the Fujimori government. While the Council of Bishops sided with most local priests in criticizing the government
for its human rights abuses, the archbishop of Lima adopted a more forgiving attitude toward the government’s brutal counterinsurgency policy.
Since the departure of Fujimori in 2000, the Church base (if not its hierarchy) remains united in promoting social justice and human rights. Catalina
Romero, Dean of the School of Social Sciences at Peru’s Catholic University, notes that the Peruvian Catholic Church continues to enjoy so much
public prestige as a political force today precisely because of its ability to
pluralize without fragmenting.13
The Peruvian and Lithuanian cases illustrate different outcomes for the
Roman Catholic Church in negotiating the separation of church and state.
The privileged place enjoyed by the Peruvian Catholic Church above all
other religions and public institutions is partly a function of its independence from the state (not to mention the internal independence of its
own public spheres) and partly a function of its ofﬁcial status as a quasigovernmental institution responsible for dispensing health, welfare, and
education. In playing a predominant role in Peru’s democratic civil society,
it has had to present both a public face, as defender of human rights and
the common good, and a private face as promoter of an orthodox creed
that increasingly ﬁnds less support among Peruvians, who are more open
to alternative lifestyles. The less favored position enjoyed by the Lithuanian Catholic Church reﬂects, by contrast, its relative inability to break out
of a narrow sectarian standpoint and diversify its message so as to embrace
broader struggles for social justice.
The case of the Catholic Church in Indonesia presents a fascinating comparison in relation to the Lithuanian and Peruvian situations. There, Catholics represent a small minority of the majority Muslim population. Yet, the
debate over whether Islam is compatible with democracy reﬂects, in some
measure, the same concerns expressed over Catholicism, though with several striking differences. To begin with, although both Islam and Catholicism have had to confront the threat of modern secularization, they have
experienced this threat differently. Muslim countries, unlike majority Catholic ones, experienced this threat as a foreign export imposed by Western
colonial powers, retained by domestic rulers bent on suppressing traditional
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religious sects as rivals to their power. For instance, coercively imposed
religious privatization and pluralization in Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty
(1925–1979) provoked an Islamist backlash. This backlash adopted the revolutionary hegemonic aims of rival Marxist dissidents without their Western
humanist ideology.
Not all Islamic fundamentalists who reacted against religious pluralization and privatization, the roots of which are in Western modernity,
sought to impose their hegemonic aims by a centralized state apparatus.
Although fundamentalist Muslim scholars have entered into tactical alliances with Islamist ruling elites in exchange for maintaining or increasing
their local pedagogical and juridical authority, they have also used this
expanded authority to challenge the Islamist state for not being Islamic
enough. It is from certain of these scholarly traditions that many contemporary Muslim reformers draw their commitment to democracy and religious pluralization.14
Indonesia’s young constitutional government arguably approximates
liberal and republican ideals more closely than any other Muslim majority
country in the world.15 Indonesia’s democracy followed upon the resignation of General Suharto and his often-brutal “New Order” regime that
ruled from 1965 to 1998. Baskara Wardaya’s chapter in this volume clearly
outlines these developments. Like the Islamic democracy that emerged in
the wake of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1999 reform was a response
to the corruption, ineptitude, and oppression (economic as well as religious
and regional) of authoritarian government. Although the government it
replaced was not consistently secular (the Suharto regime increasingly
advanced Islamic policies to divide the opposition and gather popular support), it was still condemned by many pious Muslims. This condemnation
was for siphoning off vast amounts of wealth for its own privileged elites
and ignoring the spiritual and material needs of its poorest citizens.16 Indonesians thus supported democratic reform in direct opposition to a corrupt
and brutal dictatorship that often masqueraded as Islamist.
Not surprisingly, Islamic organizations were at the forefront of the 1999
reform. Abdurrahman Wahid, a senior Islamic cleric, headed Indonesia’s
largest Muslim organization, the Awakening of Religious Scholars, or
Nahdlatul Ulama. Amien Rais, who joined Wahid in the struggle against
Suharto, led the second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, and
helped focus student demands on democracy. While Rais went on to create
a new non-Islamist political party with leadership shared with non-Muslims
(the National Mandate Party), Wahid formed his own Islamic political
party, the National Awakening Party, which expressly rejected the idea of
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an Islamic state in favor of a religiously pluralistic one. In keeping with the
pluralistic tenor of his party, Wahid joined in an alliance with the secular
nationalist party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian Democratic
Party—Struggle, which included secular Muslims, Christians, and nonMuslim minorities.17 Wahid was subsequently elected the fourth president
of the nation and the second president in post-Suharto Indonesia.
Toleration of political Islamist organizations within civil society induces
a corresponding paradox, whereby these organizations both moderate and
broaden their political platforms and arguments. Importantly, these organizations have managed to combine strategies for partially fulﬁlling strictly
religious aims, such as the passage of blasphemy laws, with commitment to
republican ideals of civil discourse. To cite the authors of an important
study on Indonesian democracy and the transformation of political Islam:
The transformation of political Islam has been one of normalization of
Islamist party politics, whereby single-issue Islamist parties have become
ever more similar to Indonesia’s larger mass-based parties in terms of
their broad campaign messages and inclusive political strategies. At
the same time, however, we observe the transformation of Indonesian
democracy through what we term insider Islamization, through which
Islamists mobilize political support for individual Islamist policies on a
case-by-case basis with the goal of inﬂuencing the substantive outcomes of the policymaking process. This is a strategy through which
Islamists change the substantive policies enacted under Indonesia’s
democratic government so as to fulﬁll Islamists’ political demands
without requiring them to prevail in competitive elections.18

While liberals have criticized Indonesia’s Islamist anti-blasphemy statute, no standard of public reasonableness is neutral vis-à-vis secular and
religious values. Recall that debates over the humanity of non-European
descended peoples (today extended to the unborn) were resolved by religion
before they were resolved by science. The fact that anti-blasphemy statutes
descend from religion makes them no less reasonable than anti-obscenity
laws. Failure to demonstrate the harmfulness of such incivilities will not
compel those offended to desist from suppressing them unless it can be
shown that suppression is more harmful than toleration. However, Indonesia’s blasphemy law may eventually be moderated by the republican doctrine
of Pancasila, which emphasizes deliberative democracy as well as social justice and the dignity of the individual.19
Deliberative democracy was on full display during the transition to the
new regime in 1999. Following Suharto’s resignation, groups representing
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almost all sectors of society pushed for elections to legitimate whatever
new political order would come into existence. In the 1999 elections, it
became apparent that Islamic parties that did not focus on single-issue
messages based on political Islam fared better than those (such as the Crescent Star Party) that did. The message was clear: Pious Muslims who
constituted a large segment of the population were also interested in issues
revolving around their emerging market economy, such as health, welfare,
security, jobs, and basic subsistence. Political Islamist parties, such as the
Prosperous Justice Party, which abandoned single-issue politics in order
to broaden their appeal to moderate and liberal Muslims, saw dramatic
improvements in their popularity in the elections of 2004 and 2009.
Another step forward occurred in 2009, when the Prosperous Justice Party
and the United Development Party joined with the nonpolitical Islamic
National Mandate Party and the National Awakening Party to re-elect the
government of former army general and corruption ﬁghter, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, himself a member of the secular Democratic Party.20
The mainstreaming of political Islamist parties has had a reciprocal
impact on substantive legislation in Indonesia. Policies that permit local
shari’a ordinances and ban blasphemy are moderated by the fact that they
are often enacted with the support of many secularists. For instance, in
2009 the legislator of Aceh, a special region of Indonesia on the island of
Sumatra, passed a “stoning law” based on shari’a that expressly punished
adulterers and other religious offenders. Less publicized was the fact that
that the passage of this law was intended as a parting shot by a legislative
majority that had just been voted out of ofﬁce. The law was vetoed by
Aceh’s democratically elected governor, Irwandi Yusuf, himself a pious
Muslim, and has not been taken up by the new legislature. Yusuf himself
worked to reign in Aceh’s Islamic “police” in his pursuit of social policies
revolving around increased spending on education and welfare and restrictions on logging. Although Yusuf was voted out of ofﬁce in 2012 for allowing palm oil concessions in protected habitats, Aceh’s legislature continues
to demonstrate a commitment to democratic accountability that exhibits a
considerable degree of republican civility on the part of moderate Muslims
and all who are principally concerned with environmental protection and
other pressing universal issues that transcend religion.21
In the absence of a strong constitutional separation of powers with
independent courts that are empowered to intervene forcefully in the
protection of minority rights, Indonesia’s Pancasila-based efforts at instituting non-domination will remain incomplete.22 Furthermore, without
the cultivation of liberal toleration and republican civility in the public
sphere (again, secured by government-sponsored consciousness-raising
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campaigns and educational reforms) the exercise of public reason will
remain equally partial. Since willingness to entertain viewpoints that clash
with one’s own is essential to deliberative democracy, Islamic reform
movements must learn to relinquish some of their power and platform for
the sake of furthering liberal and republican ideals.
Indeed, Islam can be a legitimate force within democracy only if it
actively promotes both republican and liberal values. Russell Powell makes
a convincing case for this point in his discussion of Turkey in this volume.
As with Catholicism, this outcome favors polities wherein multiple religions compete for political inﬂuence through embracing social justice
concerns, political cultures encourage deliberative compromise and constitutional power sharing, and judges aggressively defend freedom of speech
and minority rights.
It would be premature to conclude that religion can embrace these values
without relinquishing at least some of its power to secular authority. Nevertheless, the question remains: How can religion embrace liberal democracy when it claims to be the sole proprietor of divine truth? As this chapter
argues, a paradox exists in enlisting this truth in service to a merely mundane end whose realization would entail its partial denial. Born out of an
uncompromising dual commitment to social justice and the dignity of the
individual, only a faith that moves mountains can risk life itself for the sake
of ending oppression and realizing on this earth that always-imperfect semblance of God’s Kingdom.
Today there is mounting evidence that democracies, which incorporate
both liberal and civic republican values, are the best worldly approximations of that Kingdom. That the dignity of the individual instantiated in
the liberal defense of human rights can degenerate into a destructive worship of unrestrained individual self-assertion unless coupled with a civic
republican devotion to the common good has been a mainstay of democratic theory for over three hundred years. A democracy that does nothing
more than protect against tyrants and aggregate selﬁsh preferences still
permits the tyranny of the dominant preference to reign supreme. Conversely, a democracy premised on a common good that stiﬂes individual
freedom and suppresses diversity of belief and lifestyle permits an even
worse tyranny: totalitarianism.
Authentic democracy, a democracy premised on the principle of nondomination, must somehow fuse the dignity of the individual with an orientation to the common good. The ideal of civic deliberation is one way to
accomplish this aim. In upholding the possibility of achieving consensus
on a common good, this ideal retains a belief in something transcendent
and unconditional that it shares with religion in resisting the subjectivism
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of unexamined individual preferences. In upholding the superiority of
dialogue over personal revelation as a method for discovering this truth,
the ideal invokes the fallibility and open-endedness of mutual criticism. It
thus leaves open the possibility that consensus may not be reached, that
something like an agreement to disagree, coupled with an agreement to
compromise on some issues and tolerate individual differences of opinion
on others, may be inevitable.
The risking of one’s faith in civic deliberation, in a form of Socratic
dialogue, explains part of the ambivalence religion has toward democracy.
Indeed, if what has been argued in this chapter is true, then the moderation
of religious conviction in civic discourse, coupled with its “contamination”
by more mundane concerns, is a price religion must pay for remaining a
legitimate political force within democracy, as opposed to surviving solely
as a matter of private conscience. By contrast, those philosophers who
invoke the language of public reason as a touchstone for civil political
engagement have something different in mind. Public reason for them
must consist of rational disputation in which all premises descend from
commonly accepted authorities whose presumed neutrality extrudes any
reference to religion.
The motivation behind this suggestion—to avoid the totalitarian imposition of religion—is entirely laudable, but the strategy of avoiding religious
language ignores the fact that our public reason is not an abstract universal
devoid of historical tradition. Even when it assumes the outward form of
secular common sense, what is reasonable always reﬂects but the temporarily settled history of an evolving ideological struggle for recognition. The
historical confrontation of Catholicism and democracy in the twentieth
century and the parallel confrontation of Islam and democracy in the
twenty-ﬁrst century might suggest that this struggle invariably resolves
itself in the form of a strategic modus vivendi. Here, toleration of the other
is suffered out of necessity rather than embraced for its own sake. Such may
be the case initially, but the stories told here offer hope for a more civil resolution wherein “the other” is not just tolerated outwardly but internalized
dialogically.
notes
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years of “ovarian relief.” Raúl Necochea López, “Priests and Pills: Catholic
Family Planning in Peru, 1967–1976,” Latin American Research Review 43, no.
2 (2008): 34 –56.
13. Cited by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Latin American Program: Religion and Values in the Formation of a Democratic Public Space in Latin America, March 22, 2010.
14. Günes Tezcür, Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of
Moderation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 64 –76.
15. Elections in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are all
marked by corruption and instability; Malaysia is a multiethnic and multireligious nation whose democratic monarchy is founded on the structural dominance of a coalition uniting three ethnic parties (Chinese, Indian, and Malay),
with the last having a Muslim presence.
16. Robert Hefner, His Civil Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2000), esp. chaps. 6 and 7.
17. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations,’ ” 49–50.
18. Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani, “Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam,” March 21, 2010,
http://www.lsi.or.id/riset /385/Indonesian%20Democracy.
19. Pancasila combines two Sanskrit words: Panca (ﬁve) and sila (principle).
The ﬁve principles it incorporates are a belief in (1) the one and only God; (2)
just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided
by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives; and (5) social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.
These principles were fashioned by later president Sukarno in 1945 as a synthesis of monotheism, socialism, and nationalism and incorporated into the
Constitution. While the ﬁrst principle has been criticized for excluding polytheism, atheism, and agnosticism, its major thrust is support for a transcendent
foundation for respecting the inherent dignity of the individual and humanity.
20. In his ﬁrst election to the presidency Yudhoyono ran on a platform of
prosperity, peace, justice, and democracy and had the support of several
political Islamist parties, the National Awakening Party, the Crescent Star
Party, and the Reform Star Party.
21. Damien Kingsbury, “Islam and Democracy Can Happily Co-exist,”
Sydney Morning Herald, January 4, 2010.
22. Günes Mural Tezcür, “Constitutionalism, Judiciary, and Democracy
in Islamic Societies,” Polity 39, no. 4 (October 2007): 479–501.
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